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Abstract
The concept of declarative security allows the separation of security concerns from business logic and enables the development
of highly flexible and secure applications. Whereas Hibernate and the Enterprise Java Beans specification provide sufficient
authentication and authorization functionalities in the context of object persistence, the Java Data Objects (JDO) specification
designed as a lightweight persistence approach doesn’t provide any declarative security capabilities.
The novel security approach, JDOSecure, introduces a role-based permission system to the JDO persistence layer, which is
based on the Java Authentication and Authorization Service (JAAS). JDOSecure is based on the dynamic proxy approach and
ensures the collaboration with any JDO implementation. It comprises a management solution for users, roles, and permissions
and allows storing the authentication and authorization information in any arbitrary JDO resource. Furthermore, a Java-based
administration utility with a graphical user interface simplifies the maintenance of security privileges and permissions.
c© 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
The development of distributed multi-tiered enterprise applications requires an adequate solution in order to handle
the persistence of business data. Numerous approaches have been suggested like the widespread Enterprise Java
Beans (EJB) component model that covers a reasonable persistence solution for the J2EE environment. Besides
EJB, proprietary object/relational mapping tools like Hibernate or TopLink are becoming increasingly popular. They
provide a useful way of mapping the object-oriented application layer to the conceptually different data stores.
However, using proprietary, platform or database dependent solutions often locks developers into a particular vendor,
and consequently, limits the portability of applications.
With the specification of Java Data Objects (JDO) [1,2], a new object persistence standard has been established in
order to improve this situation. JDO proposes a transparent and database independent persistence abstraction layer for
Java. It enables application developers to deal with persistent objects in a transparent fashion. Furthermore, JDO as a
data store independent abstraction layer enables the mapping of domain object architectures to any arbitrary type of
data store.
However, since security issues have become more and more important, developers call for authentication and
authorization functionalities with regard to persistence solutions more often. Since JDO is designed as a lightweight
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persistence approach, it does not provide access control capabilities restricting user access to persistent objects. In case
access control is still required within the usage of JDO, individual user identifications and appropriate permissions
have to be defined inside the data store. This would lead to the loss of portability and neutralize the major advantage
of JDO.
In order to remedy this situation, JDOSecure has been developed to introduce a declarative security mechanism to
the JDO persistence layer [3,4]. Its objective is preventing unauthorized access to the data store while using the JDO-
API. It introduces a fine-grained access control mechanism to the JDO persistence layer and allows the definition
of role-based permissions. Based on the dynamic proxy approach, JDOSecure is able to collaborate with any JDO
implementation without extensive source code modification or recompilation. JDOSecure comprises a management
solution for users, roles, and permissions and allows storing the authentication and authorization information in any
arbitrary JDO resource. Furthermore, a Java-based administration utility with a graphical user interface simplifies the
maintenance of security privileges and permissions.
This paper attempts to examine security issues within the JDO persistence specification. Hence, Section 2 begins
with an introduction to the JDO specification and outlines some of its shortcomings. Section 3 introduces the
architecture of JDOSecure. In Section 4, a simple web application for a car rental company is presented as proof-
of-concept for JDOSecure. The last section gives a critical review and addresses areas for future research.
2. Persistence and security issues
This section will give a brief overview on whether and how issues relevant to security are dealt within different
persistence solutions.
2.1. The Java Data Object specification
The Java Data Objects specification is an industry standard for object persistence developed by an initiative of
Sun Microsystems under the auspices of the Java Community Process [1]. JDO was introduced in April 2002 and
is intended for the usage within the Java 2 Standard (J2SE) and Enterprise Edition (J2EE). It enables application
developers to deal with persistent objects in a transparent fashion. Thus, JDO as a data store independent abstraction
layer enables the mapping of domain object architectures to any type of data store. The recent version of JDO
(JDO 2.0) was finally approved in May 2006 [2]. Its objective is simplifying the usage of JDO e.g. by providing
a standardized object/relational mapping format to allow a higher degree of application portability. It also introduces
an attach/detach mechanism for persistent objects in order to facilitate middle tier architectures. One of its most
beneficial features is the extension of the JDO Query language (JDOQL) to support e.g. projections, aggregates, or
named queries.
The JDO specification defines two packages: The JDO Application Programming Interface (API) allows
application developers to access and manage persistent objects. The classes and interfaces of the Service Providers
Interface (SPI) are intended to be used exclusively by a JDO implementation.
The interfaces and classes of the JDO-API are located in the package javax.jdo [1,2]. The Transaction
interface provides methods for initiation and management of transactions under user control. The Query
interface allows obtaining persistent instances from the data store by providing a Java-oriented query language
called JDO Query Language (JDOQL). The PersistenceManager serves as primary application interface
and provides methods to control the life cycle of persistent objects. An instance implementing this interface
could be constructed by calling the getPersistenceManager() method of a PersistenceManagerFactory
instance. Since PersistenceManagerFactory itself is just another interface, constructing an instance prior
to this type becomes necessary. It usually could be constructed by calling the static JDOHelper method
getPersistenceManagerFactory(Properties props). The class JDOHelper is also part of the JDO-API and
enables an easy replacement of the currently preferred JDO implementation without too extensive source code
modifications. The information about the currently used JDO implementation and data store specific parameters has
to be passed to this method by a Properties object. The user identification and a password in order to access
the underlying data store are also part of the Properties object. In order to prevent misunderstandings, the JDO
persistence approach does not distinguish between different user identifications or individual permissions. With the
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construction of a PersistenceManager instance, the connection to the data store will be established and users are
able to access the JDO resource without further restrictions.
Every instance that should be managed by a JDO implementation has to implement the PersistenceCapable
interface. As part of the JDO-SPI package, the PersistenceCapable interface does not have to be implemented
explicitly by an application developer. Instead, the JDO specification prefers a post-processor tool (JDO-Enhancer)
that automatically implements the PersistenceCapable interface. It transforms regular Java classes into persistent
classes by adding the code to handle persistence. An XML-based persistence descriptor has to be configured
previously. The JDO-Enhancer evaluates this information and modifies the Java bytecode of these classes adequately.
The JDO specification assures the compatibility of the generated bytecode for the use within different JDO
implementations. The StateManager interface as part of the JDO-SPI provides the management of persistent fields
and controls the object life cycle of persistent instances.
Although JDO provides a standardized, transparent, and data store independent persistence solution including
tremendous benefits to Java application developers, the JDO specification has also been criticized in the Java
community. Besides technical details like the JDO enhancement process [5], the substantial overlaps between the
Enterprise Java Beans specification [6] and JDO [7], as well as the conceptual design as a lightweight persistence
approach has been criticized. Some experts even argue that shifting JDO to a more comprehensive approach
including distributed access functions and multi-address-space communication [8] is necessary. As a result of its
lightweight nature, JDO does not provide a role-based security architecture, e.g. restricting access of individual users
to the data store. Consequently, the JDO persistence layer does not provide any methods for user authentication or
authorization. Every user has full access privileges to store, query, update and delete persistent objects without further
restrictions. For example, using the getObjectById() method allows one to receive any persistent object whereas
the deletePersistent() method enables a user to delete objects from the data store.
At first glance, a slight improvement could be achieved by setting up individual user identifications at the level
of the data store. This would allow the construction of different and user dependent PersistenceManagerFactory
instances. Whether, however, all users should have access to a common database, individual user identifications and
appropriate permissions have to be defined inside the data store. However, configuring user permissions to restrict
access to certain objects is quite complex. For example, when using a relational database management system, the
permissions would have to be configured, based on the object–relational mapping scheme and the structure of the
database tables. Thus, it leads to the disadvantage of causing a strong dependency between the user application
and the specific data store. In addition to that, a later replacement of the currently preferred data store leads to a
time-consuming and expensive migration. It is obvious that the strong binding of security permissions to a specific
data store contradicts the intention of JDO, which is providing application programmers a data store independent
persistence abstraction layer.
2.2. Related work
The intention of this section is to survey and review related work in the context of JDO and security. Since
Hibernate and the Enterprise Java Beans Specification also represents two popular approaches to implement object
persistence in the context of distributed multi-tiered enterprise applications, the related security issues are highlighted
in the following section. Hibernate is a popular object/relational persistence and query service that originally
does not provide an access control mechanism. However, due to the need of security demands, the Hibernate
community proposes the usage of a declarative permissions approach using JAAS and the Interceptor interface [9].
Interceptors allows the registration of a custom object that gets called by Hibernate at application run-time. This
approach provides declarative security functions to Hibernate applications e.g. for the use within a session facade layer.
Since security aspects are getting increasingly important, the recent version of Hibernate provides user authentication
via JAAS. Moreover, based on the Java Authorization Contract for Containers (JACC) specification, Hibernate 3
allows CRUD operations for entities to be permissioned in a J2EE environment [10].
EJB is the server-side component architecture for the J2EE platform [11]. One of its most beneficial features is that
it frees developers from having to deal with code that handles transactional behavior, security, connection pooling,
threading, or even persistence. In the latter context, entity beans represent persistent data that can be shared across
multiple simultaneous remote and local clients. In order to control access to entity beans, the EJB specification (since
version 2.0) distinguishes between programmatic and declarative authorization. Programmatic authorization has to be
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Fig. 1. Interposition of JDOSecure between an application and a JDO implementation.
implemented by an entity bean provider using specific methods in order to perform security checks. With declarative
authorization, defining access permissions for EJB methods and security roles in a deployment descriptor becomes
possible. As a result, the EJB container performs all authorization checks.
As it turns out, Hibernate and the Enterprise Java Beans specification provide sufficient authentication and
authorization functionalities. In contrast, the JDO specification designed as a lightweight persistence approach doesn’t
provide any declarative security capabilities. In order to remedy this situation, the security architecture JDOSecure
has been developed. The next sections introduce the system architecture of JDOSecure and outlines the basic
authentication and authorization concepts.
3. The architecture of JDOSecure
This section outlines the system architecture of JDOSecure. As already noted, JDOSecure will introduce a role-
based permission system to the JDO persistence layer based on the Java Authentication and Authorization Service.
As pictured in Fig. 1, JDOSecure is intended to be interposed between an application and a JDO implementation.
In the following section, the basic authentication and authorization concepts are introduced and the collaboration
of JDOSecure and a JDO implementation is covered. Afterwards, the problem of intercepting the JDO update process
is discussed and an adequate solution is presented. Finally the users, roles and permissions management system of
JDOSecure will be outlined and the application to maintain the appropriate information will be introduced.
3.1. The authentication process
As described in Section 2.1, a PersistenceManagerFactory instance can be invoked by calling the static
getPersistenceManagerFactory(Properties props) method of the JDOHelper class. JDOSecure extends
this concept in order to facilitate the collaboration between JDOSecure and any JDO implementation. Hence,
JDOSecure provides a JDOSecureHelper class, which is derived from JDOHelper. The JDOSecureHelper class
overrides the getPersistenceManagerFactory(Properties props) method and serves as an entry-point for
JDO applications.
The Properties object passed to the JDOHelper class contains amongst others user identification and
password to access a JDO resource. As mentioned in Section 2.1, the JDO architecture does not distinguish
among different users. Therefore, the JDOSecureHelper class analyzes the passed Properties object to
authenticate a user at the level of the JDO persistence layer. Once a user has authenticated successfully, the
JDOSecureHelper class constructs a new PersistenceManagerFactory instance. The basic idea in this context
is to replace username and password in the Properties object, before the JDOSecureHelper class invokes the
getPersistenceManagerFactory(Properties props) method of the original JDOHelper class. The intention
of this replacement is to prevent a direct connection between user and JDO resource by using the JDOHelper class
instead of the JDOSecureHelper class as a “workaround”. The replaced password is unknown to the user and has to
be configured by a security administrator for the JDOSecure implementation and the JDO resource previously.
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Fig. 2. Using JAAS to implement user authentication in JDOSecure.
Fig. 3. The dynamic proxy approach.
As illustrated in Fig. 2, a LoginContext instance will be constructed by invoking the getPersistenceManager
Factory() method of the JDOSecureHelper class. The LoginContext instance forwards the authentication-
request to the JDOLoginModule. The JDOCallbackHandler instance receives the ConnectionUserName and the
ConnectionPassword property to authenticate the user. Further details about the authentication process are explained
in Section 3.5. If this process completes without throwing a SecurityException, a PersistenceManagerFactory
instance is constructed. In order to enable the implementation of an adequate access control mechanism, the
JDOSecureHelper class does not return the PersistenceManagerFactory instance directly, but it returns a proxy
of the PersistenceManagerFactory instance back to the JDO-based application as it will be described in the
following section.
3.2. JDOSecure and the dynamic proxy approach
There are two prerequisite conditions that could affect the acceptance of JDOSecure. First, JDOSecure should
be independent of a concrete JDO implementation in order to ensure an ongoing portability between different JDO
implementations. And secondly, an overall approach should not contradict the JDO specification. In an attempt to
meet these requirements, the presented security architecture is based on the dynamic proxy concept (cf. Fig. 3).
According to [12], a proxy provides “a surrogate or placeholder for another object to control access to it”.
Therefore, a static proxy implements the original objects interfaces and delegates all method invocations to the original
object. In this context, one disadvantage is the fact that the creation of a proxy has to be done at compile time. Instead,
the dynamic proxy concept allows the construction of a proxy instance dynamically at run-time [13]. They could
be constructed by using the static newProxyInstance()-method of the java.lang.reflect.Proxy-class. This
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Fig. 4. Using the dynamic proxy approach to implement user authorization.
method allows the creation of a proxy instance for a set of interfaces at run-time. A dynamic proxy instance will
always be associated with an InvocationHandler and any method invocation to the proxy will be redirected to the
InvocationHandler.invoke() method. The invoke() method allows to intercept method calls before they are
forwarded to the original object.
The JDOSecure architecture is based on the dynamic proxy concept, as shown in Fig. 4. The basic idea
is interposing a proxy between a JDO-based application on the one hand, and the JDO implementation on
the other. As mentioned in Section 3.1, the JDOSecureHelper.getPersistenceManagerFactory() method
returns a dynamic proxy instance of the PersistenceManagerFactory class. This would allow manipulating the
getPersistenceManager() method to return a proxy instead of the original PersistenceManager instance.
Finally, it becomes possible to validate permissions in the associated InvocationHandler instance, before a method
call is forwarded to the PersistenceManager. The following paragraph will explain the architecture more in detail.
As mentioned above, the JDOSecureHelper.getPersistenceManagerFactory() method returns a dynamic
proxy instance of the PersistenceManagerFactory class. Thus, the JDOSecure architecture avoids a direct
interaction with the original PersistenceManagerFactory-instance and allows to manipulate method calls
which are directed to the PersistenceManagerFactory. Invoking the getPersistenceManager() method,
the PMFInvocationHandler returns a second proxy, in this case a proxy of the PersistenceManager
instance. JDOSecure uses the associated PMInvocationHandler to manipulate method calls directed to the
PersistenceManager. Thus, the PMInvocationHandler represents the entry-point in order to implement the
authorization function and to determine whether or not a user is allowed to invoke a PersistenceManager method.
3.3. The authorization process
JDOSecure enables the set-up of user specific permissions in order to allow or disallow the invocation of
PersistenceManager methods. As already mentioned, a user receives a proxy of a PersistenceManager instance
(PMProxy) by invoking the getPersistenceManager() method. Thus, JDOSecure is able to use the assigned
PMInvocationHandler to validate, if an authenticated JDOUser has the permission to make a specific method
invocation. The permissions are managed by separate users, roles, and permissions management system (see
Section 3.5). JDOSecure distinguishes between different permissions (Table 1) in order to restrict the access to the
different PersistenceManager methods. JDOSecure also enables the limitation of user permissions to packages,
classes or even objects.
As an example, a user who should be able to invoke the makePersistent() method for a package org.test.
sample has to obtain the following permission: JDOMakePersistentPermission "org.test.sample.*".
In order to validate whether a user has the permission to invoke a specific PersistenceManager method,
a JDOSecurityAction instance will be constructed and passed to the static doAs(subject, action) method
of the Subject class. Consequently, the validation of a user permission is delegated to the AccessController
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Table 1
JDOSecure permissions
Methods of a PersistenceManager, that Necessary permission to invoke the according
require specific permissions to be method for a specific class or package:
executed in the context of JDOSecure:
makePersistent(..) JDOMakePersistentPermission < Class >
makePersistentAll(..)
deletePersistent(..) JDODeletePersistentPermission < Class >
deletePersistentAll(..)
getExtent(..) JDOQueryPermission < Class >
Query.execute(..)
- JDOUpdatePermission < Class >
as part of the Java 2 Security Architecture. If a user has the appropriate permission to invoke a specific
PersistenceManager method, the method call is forwarded to the original PersistenceManager instance. If not,
a Java SecurityException will be thrown and the access to the JDO resource is rejected.
JDOSecure allows the assignment of permissions not only for packages or classes but also for individual
objects. Since such objects will be constructed at application run-time, JDOSecure can’t manage the handling of
object permissions exclusively by itself. Therefore, the collaboration between a JDO application and JDOSecure is
necessary in order to benefit from object permissions. JDOSecure provides a setObjectPermission(Principal,
Class, Object-ID) method that allows a JDO application to assign an object permission to a user or role.
In order to prevent an unauthorized use of this method, JDOSecure checks whether an application has a
SetObjectOwnerPermission for the specific class. With the help of a AllowJDOObjectPermission <Class>
<Action>, the security administrator could define which permissions are being implied by holding an object
permission for a specific class. Therefore it becomes possible e.g. to allow a user to update attributes of a specific
object but without deleting the object itself. Finally, the PMInvocationHandler checks if a JDOObjectPermission
<Class> exists, before method invocations are forwarded to the PersistenceManager.
Although the JDOSecure authorization mechanism allows to restrict the creation, query and deletion of
PersistentCapable instances, it is not suitable for the JDO update process. This problem will be addressed in
the next section.
3.4. JDOSecure and the update of object attributes
JDO introduces the concept of transparent persistence and consequently, JDO doesn’t provide any additional
methods to update object attributes or flushing instances to the data store. The above described security mechanism to
verify user permissions when invoking methods of the JDO-API, does not work in case of JDO updates. As already
mentioned, the JDO enhancer modifies regular Java classes in order to implement the PersistentCapable interface.
Additionally, all setter methods are modified, so that they do not change attributes directly. Instead, by invoking a setter
method, an associated StateManager instance will be notified. This StateManager is responsible for updating the
attributes in the corresponding PersistentCapable instance as well as to propagate these updates to the database.
The idea in this context is replacing the StateManager by another proxy and to validate the user permissions in the
corresponding InvocationHandler instance. As defined in the JDO specification, a StateManager instance will be
created by the JDO implementation with the invocation of the PersistenceManager methods makePersistent(),
makePersistentAll(), getExtent(), getObjectById() as well as the execute() method of the Query
instance. With the use of JDOSecure, the user does not interact with the PersistenceManager directly, but with the
PMInvocationHandler instance. Before JDOSecure returns a PersistentCapable instance to the user, replacing
the corresponding StateManager by a proxy becomes possible.
In order to implement this approach in JDOSecure, the PMInvocationHandler accesses the private
jdoStateManager field by using the java.lang.reflection API to construct a dynamic proxy for the
StateManager. In a second step, the PMInvocationHandler replaces the reference to the StateManager in the
PersistentCapable instance with the proxy. The technical details like security issues when accessing private fields
by using the java.lang.reflection API and other complications (e.g. the jdoReplaceStateManager() method
of a StateManager) have been disregarded in order to improve clarity. However, JDOSecure enables the access
control of the JDO update mechanism by introducing another proxy and a JDOUpdatePermission. As all other
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Fig. 5. Binding between the users, roles, and permissions management system and JDOSecure.
JDOSecure permissions, the JDOUpdatePermission could be specified individually for every user and a specific
package, class or object.
3.5. The management of users, roles, and permissions in JDOSecure
The JDOSecure users, roles, and permissions management system allows to store the information which is
necessary for authentication and authorization in a separate JDO resource. The interaction between the management
component and JDOSecure is illustrated in Fig. 5. The left part of this illustration corresponds to Fig. 1. The right
part describes the schematic architecture of the users, roles, and permissions management system consisting of the
administration utility, the users, roles, and permission management component, and a JDO-Implementation to access
a separated JDO resource in order to store the authentication and authorization data.
As pictured in Fig. 2, the JDOCallbackHandler passes the user identification and the password to the
JDOLoginModule. If a Credential object in the JDO resource matches the same user identification and password,
the authentication process was completed successfully. In this case, the JDOLoginModule passes all Principal
objects that are associated with the Credential object to the LoginContext. Finally, JAAS adds these Principal
objects to the current session (Subject).
In order to enable the mapping of the authentication and authorization information to any arbitrary JDO resource,
the users, roles, and permission management system implements two interfaces: The JDOLoginModule class
implements the Pluggable Authentication Modules (PAM) standard and enables the access to the authentication
data like username and password. The JDOPolicy class extends the default Java Policy implementation and grants
access to the JDO resource. For more details about the users, roles, and permission management system we refer
to [14].
The Java-based administration utility is introduced for the purpose of simplifying the authentication and
authorization information. It is intended to be used by a security administrator, from a local or even a remote computer
by using a JDO connection. The administration utility provides a Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) mode (cf. [15]),
which allows the assignment of individual permissions for a role or a single user. Fig. 6 shows the permissions
granted to the “Internet” user. As it is described in Section 4.3, within these permissions the user is able to store every
PersistentCapable object but only to query for example.Car and example.Reservation instances.
4. The car rental demonstration application
In this section, we will demonstrate the benefits of JDOSecure based on a simple web application for a car rental
company. The intention of the application is not to provide a full-fledged car rental system that supports customer
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Fig. 6. Authorization settings in the JDOSecure administration utility.
Fig. 7. Available cars matching the users criteria.
or billing management. The motivation behind the development of this application is mainly to illustrate potential
impacts caused by the security flaws of the JDO architecture.
The application is implemented by using the Java Servlet technology and JDO as persistence layer. The web
application is available at http://projekt-jdo.uni-mannheim.de/demo/ in two different versions. The first version
implements JDO directly without any security enhancements whereas the second version uses JDOSecure to prevent
security and vulnerability issues. In Section 4.1, the general details about the web application are introduced.
Section 4.2 identifies a major security threat in the first version of the web application. The last section will give
an answer to the question, on how JDOSecure could prevent such security problems in general.
4.1. About the demo application
The car rental application is intended to serve as proof-of-concept for JDOSecure. When visiting https://
projekt-jdo.uni-mannheim.de/car/ or the secure version at https://projekt-jdo.uni-mannheim.de/carsecure/, the rental
car welcome site guides a customer to search for available cars. After entering pick-up date, return date and a preferred
vehicle type, the web site presents an overview of all available cars matching these criteria (cf. Fig. 7). A table lists
these cars including some useful information like car type, price per day, and a link to receive more details about a
specific car.
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Fig. 8. UML class diagram describing the car rental domain.
When clicking on a “Car Information Detail” link a popup window appears, which displays additional information,
e.g. if the equipment of the car comprises a radio, a navigation system, or air conditioning. After pressing the “next”
button, the customer is asked to recheck his/her settings. By confirming the reservation, the customer is asked to enter
some personal information and a valid credit card number. When completing the reservation, the customer receives a
unique reservation number.
The car rental application consists of four Java classes representing the car rental domain (cf. Fig. 8): In this model,
a Customer has to use his/her CreditCard to make a Reservation. A Reservation is always associated within
exactly one vehicle (Car) and is initiated by one Customer.
The business logic was developed as a straightforward web application based on the Java Servlet technology. A
Java Servlet receives browser requests and sends a response back to the client. In this scenario, the business logic
consists of five Java Servlets, which all use a HttpSession in order to identify a customer and to store the arguments
being entered by the user. Each web site a user can visit is represented by another Java Servlet class.
The persistence mechanism is implemented by using the Java Data Objects-Specification. Since JDO proposes the
concept of transparent persistence, it allows persisting pure “Plain Old Java Objects” (POJOs). After preparing this
classes by the usage of a JDO enhancer, the classes of the car rental domain could be stored directly by using the
JDO-API.
4.2. Security issues in the first example
When analyzing the mechanism behind the “Car Information Detail” link, it turns out that the arguments (e.g.
like the car-ID) are passed through the Servlet by attaching the information to the end of the URL after a question
mark. For example, the URL https://projekt-jdo.uni-mannheim.de/car/showdetails?type=Car&filter=carID&value=6
is mapped to the ShowDetails Servlet and passes three arguments (type = “Car”, filter=“carID”, and value=“6”)
to this class. Fig. 9 shows the Servlet results.
Even the web site appears rather inconspicuous; it turns out that the ShowDetails class is implemented in a
generic way. It allows receiving detailed information not only for a car but also for different classes (e.g. to receive
detailed information about a motorbike). Listing 1 presents a code snipped of the ShowDetails class. It illustrates
the “generic” use of JDOQL to receive a Collection of persistent objects matching the criteria expressed by the
given arguments. In the example discussed above, the Collection would consist of all persistent instances of type
example.Car where the expression CarID=="6" is true. In order to guard against misunderstandings, the collection
in this case would only consist of one object.
Even this functionality appears as a highly flexible and sophisticated approach at first glance, it unfortunately
poses a major security threat. When manipulating the arguments attached to the URL listed above e.g. by
changing “Car” to “CreditCard” the security problem becomes obvious. After a few tries, someone can find the
appropriate arguments to receive credit card information for maybe illegal use: https://projekt-jdo.uni-mannheim.de/
car/showdetails?type=CreditCard&filter=creditCardType&value=visa. Fig. 10 shows some credit card information as
a result of the presented URL.
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Fig. 9. Car details — information screen.
Fig. 10. Online available credit card information — a major security threat.
Class c = Class.forName (" example ."+ type);
Extent ext = pm.getExtent(c, false);
Query q = pm.newQuery(ext);
q.setFilter(filter +"==\""+ value +"\"");
Collection col = (Collection) q.execute ();
Listing 1. Code Snipped of the ShowDetails Class describing the usage of JDOQL to receive a Collection of persistent instances matching the
criteria expressed by the given arguments type, filter and value.
Even if it is simply possible to rewrite the application code of the ShowDetails class to prevent the undesirable
access to the credit card information, it demonstrates unequivocally the security flaws of the JDO architecture. In the
next section, we will give an answer to the question, on how JDOSecure could prevent such security and vulnerability
problems in general.
4.3. How JDOSecure prevent adequate security and vulnerability issues
JDOSecure allows controlling access to store, query, update and delete persistent objects when using the JDO-
API. It introduces a fine-grained access control mechanism to the JDO persistence layer and allows the definition
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Fig. 11. JDOSecure prevents the access to the credit card information.
of role-based permissions. For the second version of the car rental application, we have used JDOSecure to define a
“webuser” role that obtains the permissions listed in Table 2.
Because we encapsulated the construction of the PersistenceManagerFactory instance in a separate
method, only the modification of a single source code line is necessary to activate JDOSecure: Just the
statement to construct a PersistenceManagerFactory has to be replaced in the source code by this line
JDOSecureHelper.getPersistenceManagerFactory(props). Nevertheless, the adjustment of several path and
library settings as well as the set-up of different JDOSecure configuration files are still necessary. For more information
about how JDOSecure could be used to introduce role-based permissions in JDO-based applications, we refer to [16].
When exploring the “credit card” link as presented above in the context of the second application, the benefits
of JDOSecure will become obvious. By following the https://projekt-jdo.uni-mannheim.de/carsecure/showdetails?
type=CreditCard&filter=creditCardType&value=visa link, a user will receive an Access denied message, because
JDOSecure prevents data store access to CreditCard instances for the authenticated webuser (see Fig. 11).
To provide a more adequate error message instead of printing the java.security.AccessControlException
in case of a missing permission on the screen, the web application catches these security Exceptions by the use of
simple try/catch blocks. However, the error messages are also available in the appropriate Servlet container log
files. Listing 2 shows the interesting part of the catalina.out tomcat log file, that is used in this example.
...
INFO: Server startup in 6257 ms
Initializing JDOPolicyOX ...
JDOSecure: Authentication succeeded for user ’webuser ’.
authentication succeeded
Authenticated user has the following Principals:
’JDOUser: webuser ’
java.security.AccessControlException: access denied
(de.unimannheim.wifo.jdosecure.permissions.JDOQueryPermission
example.CreditCard)
...
Listing 2. Tomcat Logfile Snipped.
5. Conclusion
In this article, the JDOSecure architecture is introduced and the main advantages are highlighted. JDOSecure
introduces a fine-grained access control mechanism to the JDO persistence layer and allows the definition of role-
based permissions. The permissions could be defined individually for every user/role with regards to certain operations
(create, delete, update, and query) and a specific class/package or an object. JDOSecure comprises a management
solution for users, roles, and permissions and allows storing the authentication and authorization information in any
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Table 2
Defined JDOSecure permissions
Permission Class
JDOMakePersistentPermission *
JDOQueryPermission example.Car
JDOQueryPermission example.Reservation
arbitrary JDO resource. Furthermore, a Java-based administration utility with a graphical user interface simplifies the
maintenance of security privileges and permissions.
In order to emphasize the benefits of JDOSecure, a simple web application for a car rental company was
implemented as a proof-of-concept. The application offers the online reservation of a rental car by entering personal
information and a valid credit card number. By analyzing the application, it turns out that a manipulated URL could
be used to access credit card information. Even though this is the result of inadequate programming, it unequivocally
demonstrates the security flaws of the JDO architecture. JDOSecure could be easily adapted for the use in JDO-based
application to close this security gap. It allows restricting access to a JDO resource by defining individual permissions
for users and their roles. In this example, it could contribute to preventing access to credit card information.
Even JDOSecure could improve the security of JDO applications, one potential shortcoming of JDOSecure should
also be mentioned. Since JDOSecure provides a fine-grained access control mechanism, it becomes obvious that the
management of permissions and the access control mechanism has negative side-effects on performance. Even worse,
the dynamic proxy approach including a huge number of indirections between the constructed instances and their
proxies leads to another deterioration of performance. In order to get a first impression of the performance behavior,
we have suggested a test scenario that covers the measurement of CRUD operations. Each test case has been executed
several times with a set of different number of persistent objects. It turns out that JDOSecure reduces the performance
in this test scenario at about 15%–20% on an average. In the future, we aim to extend our performance tests and are
confident of achieving a slightly better performance for JDOSecure.
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